

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

H

DDI-9174-82/1
17 November 1982

NSC review completed

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central IntelligenceTHROUGH : Executive Director
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Deputy Director for IntelligenceFROM :
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence StaffSUBJECT : NSC Verification Committee

25X1

1. Action: Your decision as to who will be your member of the NSC
Verification Committee, as established by NSDD-65 on 10 November 1982.

25X1

2. Background: NSDD-65, issued earlier this month, established an NSC
Verification Committee. (You received a copy of this NSDD last week.) This
Committee is chaired by Judge William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. My private understanding from General Boverie of
the NSC Staff is that Judge Clark (or his Deputy, Mr. Robert MacFarlane) will
in fact be running this Committee's meetings.

25X1

3. From my perspective, there are a number of points you ought to know
before you get to my recommendation below in paragraph 14. I think the DCI's
Representative should be very high level because this NSDD is pregnant with
potential problems. The issue is the age-old one of the division between the
Intelligence Community, versus the policy community, equities over the nature
and use of intelligence about arms control matters. I think the NSDD's
language will lead to the re-opening of the heated and long-running dispute
about intelligence matters, such as responsibilities and performance. Because
of the significance to the Intelligence Community of that issue, the DCI
member of this NSC Committee ought to be as high level as is possible.

25X1

4. Moreover, my private research indicates that ACDA, because of this
NSDD's great potential impact on ACDA, probably will have its Deputy Director,
Mr. Robert T. Grey, as its member; ACDA will not use Dr. Manfred Eimer, Acting
Chief of ACDA's Verification Bureau. At the same time, Department of State
people tell me privately that they probably will not decide on a member until
they see if the NSC is serious about this new Committee; I think that this
approach is a mistake. In any case, you should know that my predecessor
believes that a Verification Committee reviewing Soviet activities related to
compliance from a policy perspective should consist of very high-level agency
representatives who are familiar with arms control matters, but not
individuals who are (or were) intimately involved in negotiating the
agreements.

25X1

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

DDI-9174-82/1

SUBJECT: NSC Verification Committee [redacted]

25X1

5. A major example of such a potential problem is the "Red Team." I believe the DCI should have the major voice in that group about all issues involving the USSR--e.g., capabilities and intentions. I think this point will be contentious all by itself. In any case, there are many people in the US Government now who will try to use this "Red Team" as a "cat's paw" for their political ends. This is likely to lead to more collisions over intelligence, a la the past episodes with people inside and outside the government--before this Administration and during its early phases. [redacted]

25X1

6. I had a private telephone call with Gen. Richard Boverie of the NSC Staff. He said that Judge Clark (or his Deputy, Robert McFarlane) will chair this Committee's meetings. In fact, though, Gen. Boverie said he does not know yet how this Committee will operate, whether there will be lower-level entities working for the Committee (as the NSDD says on page 3), or when such decisions will be made. My guess is that lower-level entities will have to exist. [redacted]

25X1

7. It is not yet clear just how this new NSC Committee will relate to the existing arms control policy mechanisms--SIGs, IGs and the recently established joint START/INF working group on verification, which is co-chaired by State and Defense. (As background, I have attached a copy of the IG memorandum establishing this joint group.) At the minimum, this new NSC Committee will tend to paralyze the existing, on-going verification work. Quite frankly, I thought I could get further than I have, into the process of fixing the IG's performance on verification issues, before this NSDD was issued. During your (i.e., DCI's) trip [redacted] I made a point that the IG process was broken but that Adm. Howe was trying to fix it. In fact, he--and I--sort of got pre-empted. It may be that my efforts with Adm. Howe to fix the IG process stimulated the NSC to issue this NSDD more quickly than they originally intended. In any case, I am told privately that Department of State will argue to keep the joint verification working group, with its products going to the IG and then to this new NSC Committee. The idea is useful but the outcome of it is moot. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

8. Also, as background, I have attached a private copy of a memorandum, from Judge Clark to ACDA Director Rostow, which bears on the NSDD. You ought to be aware of the memorandum's contents, and especially its political overtones, which almost surely will impact on the DCI's equities. This memorandum to Director Rostow may result in another attempt by ACDA to squeeze its way into the Intelligence Community or--at least--to assume functions heretofore within the purview of the DCI. Moreover, the NSC Staff may try to use the NSDD and Judge Clark's memorandum to push ACDA in such directions. [redacted]

25X1

9. For all those reasons, while the DCI's member of this NSC Committee should be very high level, the day-to-day representation and work to support the member ought to be done--as is substantively appropriate--by either the

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

DDI-9174-82/1

SUBJECT: NSC Verification Committee [REDACTED]

25X1

C/ACIS or NIO/SP. The mandate of the Committee is sufficiently large that neither C/ACIS, nor NIO/SP, can handle all of it alone; working together closely as we now do will produce complete coverage. In fact, most of the Committee's mandate will be covered by C/ACIS. [REDACTED]

25X1

10. One of the obvious features of NSDD-65 is the apparent movement to the NSC, from the Departments of State and Defense, of the control of this arms control issue. I see this as one more step in the process of the NSC regaining its past position of leadership. You might be interested to know that the inter-agency work last Saturday on the MX decision package was led by the NSC Staff. And I know you are aware of the NSC's recent role in counterintelligence. [REDACTED]

25X1

11. At the same time, I think you ought to know that no matter who is given the responsibility to keep up with this NSC Committee, its creation will add substantially to the workload of this Staff and of the Intelligence Community. In my view, this Staff will need at least one more analyst to keep up with the Committee. This is because we barely can keep up now with the existing Executive Branch workload and this Committee no doubt will be requiring even more research, analysis, and integration of intelligence. My sense, moreover, is that a similar impact on resources will occur in other parts of the Intelligence Community. Everyone in the Intelligence Community involved in arms control support is heavily loaded with work, which you no doubt know already. [REDACTED]

25X1

12. In my view, the Intelligence Community aspect of supporting this NSC Committee will--and ought to--occur within the framework of the DCI Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations. And the work will--and ought to--devolve on the inter-agency SALT Monitoring Working Group, which I chair for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. In addition, I have a charge from the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to look into strengthening and redefining the Working Group. A copy of the memorandum on that issue is attached as well. [REDACTED]

25X1

13. Staff Position: Dr. Larry Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, and I have discussed and agreed upon the recommendation in paragraph 14 below. (OUO)

14. Recommendation: That you concur in having the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence be the formal member of this NSC Verification Committee on your behalf and in having the day-to-day representation and work in support of the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence be done--as is substantively appropriate--either by NIO/SP or by me. The mandate of this Committee is sufficiently large that neither NIO/SP nor I can handle all of it alone; working together closely as we now do will produce complete coverage. In fact, most of the Committee's mandate will be covered by me and this Staff. [REDACTED]

25X1

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

DDI-9174-82/1

SUBJECT: NSC Verification Committee ()

25X1

15. If there is anything else I may do to assist you here, either additional work or to answer questions, please call and let me know. (U)

25X1

Attachments:

Copy of Memorandum for IG Members

Copy of Memorandum for Director, ACDA

Copy of Memorandum for Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

DDI-9174-82/1

SUBJECT: NSC Verification Committee (S)

APPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

Distribution:

Original - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ExDir
1 - Executive Registry
1 - ADDI
1 - DDI
1 - DDI Registry
1 - C/ACIS
1 - C/NIC
1 - NIO/SP
1 - ACIS Chrono

DDI:ACIS: (15Nov82)

25X1

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY